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After the former CEO exit and quarterly disappointing results, McDonald’s stock went 
down 10.7% of its all-time high of $221.93 (Aug 19). We provide an in-depth DCF valuation 
analysis explaining the main assumptions behind our BUY recommendation. We propose a 
price-target of $225.91, mainly driven by the re-franchising success – that is boosting operating 
margin; and by same-store sales – which have been benefiting from further implementations of 
the Velocity Growth Plan. Moreover, we looked further to strategy, shareholders and capital’s 
structure, making sure that McDonald’s comparables were considered in order to provide a 




























This work used infrastructure and resources funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
(UID/ECO/00124/2013, UID/ECO/00124/2019 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209), POR 
Lisboa (LISBOA-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209) and POR 
Norte (Social Sciences DataLab, Project 22209). 
          MASTER IN FINANCE 
THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR ACADEMIC PURPOSES BY SOFIA PEDROSO AND GONÇALO RAMOS, MASTER’S  IN 
FINANCE STUDENTS OF THE NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS. THE REPORT WAS SUPERVISED BY A NOVA SBE FACULTY 
MEMBER, ACTING IN A MERE ACADEMIC CAPACITY, WHO REVIEWED THE VALUATION METHODOLOGY AND THE FINANCIAL MODEL.  
 (PLEASE REFER TO THE DISCLOSURES AND DISCLAIMERS AT END OF THE DOCUMENT) 
  






§  After the prior CEO Steve Easterbrook exit and the quarterly 
disappointing results, below analysts’ estimates, McDonald’s 
stock went down 10.7% from its all-time high of $221.93 a share, 
registered in August, to $197.61, in 31th December 2019.  
§ We rate the stock with a BUY recommendation, and we 
estimate a total expected return of 17.3% in the following 12-
month period, already considering cash gains from dividends and 
buybacks. 
§  The re-franchising target continues with a long-term goal of 
the company to be 95% franchised, which we estimate to be 
achieved in 2024, driving operating margin even further upwards. 
§ Half of the systemwide restaurants, as of two thirds of the 
US restaurants are already re-modelled under “The Experience 
of the Future”, improving customer experience and guest counts. 
§ McDelivery is expected to represent $4 billions of the sales 
in 2019 and is now available in over 60% of the company’s 
restaurants worldwide. 
§ In 2019 McDonald’s acquired Apprente and Dynamic Yield, 
AI platforms which promise to disrupt customer experience. 
Dynamic Yield is already incorporated in 9,500 drive-thru in US. 
  
Company description 
McDonald’s Corporation is a 79 years old originally American 
company operating through 37,855 stores (2018) in QSR 
segment of the Restaurant industry. At year-end 2018, 93% of 
the business was franchised. The company is organized into four 
main segments: US, International Lead Markets, High Growth 
Markets and Foundational Markets & Corporate. 
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 2017 2018E 2019F 
Revenues (million $) 21 025 21 249 21 156 
EBITDA (million $) 10 450 11 014 11 180 
EBIT (million $) 8 968 9 478 9 596 
Operating Margin (%) 42.7% 44.6% 45.4% 
Net Profit (million $) 5 924 5 654 5 571 
EPS ($) 7.7 7.4 7.3 
CAPEX (million $) 2 742 2 364 2 248 
Net Debt (million $) 30 420 34 983 35 512 
Dividend Payout Ratio (%) 55% 49.5% 44.3% 
ROIC (%) 15% 15.7% 15.5% 
Core FCF (million $) 6 156 5 998 6 310 
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McDonald’s in Context 
Ray Krok is the mastermind behind McDonald’s empire, the iconic brand 
recognized worldwide, counting 37,855 stores in more than 120 geographies 
[year-end 2018], close to 210,000 employees, over $96.1 billion in systemwide 
sales (franchised and company-operated sales) of which $21 billions represents 
company’s revenues (company-operated sales plus rents, royalties and fees 
charged to franchisees). McDonald’s has been disrupting the informal eating out 
segment of the Restaurant industry, impacting the way we live our lives today.  
The provision of a highly efficient quick service with a uniform pattern, either in the 
tastiness, either in the time record methodology was the turning point of a whole 
sector. Although McDonald’s owes its worldwide success to Ray Krok, the original 
concept came from the McDonald’s brothers, Richard and Maurice, who set up 
the very first “McDonalds’s Bar-B-Que” in San Bernardino, California, and then in 
1940, later relaunched as “McDonald’s”. In 1948, the brothers created the 
“Speeded Service System” organizing the kitchen as an assembly line. Later, they 
ended up selling their equity to Krok.  
Throughout the years the company has been developing and improving its 
franchised business model, turning out to become primarily a franchisor with 93% 
of the restaurants operating under this model [2018 year-end]. The company 
organizes the contracts into: Conventional Franchise, Development License or 
Affiliate (figure 2). Under the first, McDonald’s holds the real estate infrastructures 
and/or secures a long-term lease for the location and the franchisee pays for the 
facilities, i.e. equipment, signs, seating and décor (2018’s Annual Report). 
Franchisees are also required to reinvest capital in the business; however, if 
necessary, the company co-invests to enhance further improvements. Typically, 
this model lasts for 20 years and cash flows for the main company comes in the 
form of rent payment, royalties - upon a percentage of the sales, with minimum 
specified rent payments, and initial fees to be paid upon the opening or the 
provision of a new grant. Under the second, licensees enter with the real estate 
and with the facilities, are required to manage, operate the business, develop and 
open new brunches. The cash-flows are returned in the form of initial fees in the 
same circumstances described above, and as royalties upon a sales’ percentage. 
To note that Affiliate arrangements represent a small portion of the whole model, 
since its only used in a limited number of foreign markets. Also, the share of the 
net results in this last format are recorded in Unconsolidated affiliates, since it 
requires equity investment from the company. According to the annual report of 
2018, the company owned approximately 50% of the land and approximately 80% 
of the buildings of its restaurants in consolidated markets at year-end 2018 and 
2017. 
Fig. 1. McDonald’s Initial Menu.  
 
Fig. 2. Sales Distribution in % of Annual Sales. 
Source: Company Report.  
 
Fig. 3. Sales Distribution in % of Annual Sales. 
Source: Company Report.  
 
Sales Distribution (%) 2016 2017 2018
Conventional Franchised 80% 76% 73%
Developmental Licensed 13% 16% 16%



















Steve Easterbrook, previous McDonald’s’ CEO, launched two leading                                                                                                                                                                                            
strategic plans: The Turnaround Plan (2015) and The Velocity Growth Plan 
(2017). 
 
I. Turnaround Plan 
After 5 years (2010 – 2014) of unsatisfactory performance the company 
decided to reorganize international operations by maturity and growth potential, 
namely: US, International Lead Markets (established markets), High Growth 
Markets (high potential restaurant growth), and Foundational Markets & Corporate 
(the remaining markets and company corporate operations), replacing the 
previous regional segmentation: Us, Europe, Asia/Pacific, Middle East and Africa. 
Moreover, improving operational growth became an urgency forcing the company 
rethinking menu offerings and quality, by removing some sandwiches, while 
adding premium key ingredients. According to Business Insider, the menu grew 
42.4%, between 2007 and 2015, from 85 to 121 items, and drive-thru waiting time 
achieved 3 minutes (the longest average time in 15 years). Refining ingredients’ 
quality become a “top priority” for Easterbrook after the food safety scandal in 
Asia, which triggered public distrust over the company and lead to a 15% loss in 
sales, in 2014. At the time, franchisors relationships were at all-time low levels, 
with 81% of the company business model under the franchise scheme. Moreover, 
the company set the target to become 95% franchised in the long-term. This plan 
was a huge success, driving the company’s stock from $118, year-end 2015, to 
$172, year-end 2017, an increase of 45.8% in 2 years.  
 
II. The Velocity Growth Plan (VGP) 
 The Velocity Growth Plan has been the guide to pursuit a customer-centric 
strategy, as it was designed to drive sustainable guest count growth supported by 
three main growth accelerators: retaining existing customers, regaining and 
converting casual to comitted customers. In order to strenght those drivers, the 
company identified three main pillars:  
1. Experience of the Future (EOTF) 
The EOTF is deeply tied to the digital strategy of the company and consists on 
the modernization of all McDonald’s restaurants in terms of design, customer 
interaction and technological transformation. This concept introduces “Restaurant 
Guest Experience Leader”, table service and curb-side pick-up aiming to provide 
a better experience, driving incremental visits and increasing average checks. 
Under this format, McDonald’s’ was able to improve the options for customers to 
interact with the brand, either when ordering, paying or collecting, and also adding 
 
Fig. 6.  Self-Order Kiosks.  
Fig. 5. Velocity Growth Plan Scheme.  
Source: Company Report. 
 
Fig. 4. Turnaround Plan Scheme.  
Source: Company Report. 
 
 








“on table” service. At year-end 2018, there were already 17,000 restaurants with 
self-order kiosks, more than 21,000 restaurants with digital menu boards and over 
22,000 restaurants allowed for “Mobile Order and Pay”. 
2. Digital 
The Digital has been the fuel of the transformation by converting restaurants 
into what McDonald’s believes to be the “Experience of the Future” while 
contributing to further integration through the mobile application. At year-end 
2017, over 20 million users were registered in the App, only in the US. The global 
mobile app become a key component in McDonald’s strategy since it allows direct 
customer interaction, bringing convenience i.e. “Mobile Order & Pay” and also 
advertising promotions and discounts, while rewarding repetead purchases 
through a system of points. Each customer is identified by a QR code allowing the 
company to monitor its journey while refining efficiency and gathering data.  
3. Delivery  
McDonald’s partnered with Grab (Asia), Grub Hub, DoorDash and Uber Eats, 
being this last already available in 12,000 restaurants across 60 locations 
worldwide in 2018 (July 19th, Business Insider). McDonald’s realized that 
extending its services would be the way to increase convenience, while allowing 
the company to pierce other layers of the market. As of 2018’s year-end, delivery 
was available in half of the systemwide outlets and is still expanding. In 2019, 
23,000 restaurants in over 80 countries are able to provide the service. According 
to the company’s former CEO, in the 2019’s Q3 Earnings Call, there was an 
average of 10 McDelivery orders per second, 864,000 orders a day, 26 million 
orders a month and 315 million orders a year. As of 2019 year-end, the sales 
through delivery are expected to account 4% systemwide sales ($4 billion), 
achieving the $5 billion in 2020. Customer satisfaction indexes have been rising, 
boosted by the service extent while the company have been benefiting by higher 
average checks (in compassion with non-delivery transactions), higher re-order 
rates and average checks are 1.5 to 2 times higher. 
 
III.  Discounts and Coupons 
In the last couple of years, companies in the QSR industry have been fighting 
for market share resulting in a aggressive price competition. In order to remain 
competitive, McDonald’s launched “$1 $2 $3 Dollar Menus”, “McPick 2 for $5”, 
“Buy One Get One for $1” and others discount campaigns. Even though it had 
started in the US, where competition is fierceless, it is already in the remaining 
geographies.  This strategy have been driving the increase in guest counts up as 
it acts as an invitation for customers to visit McDonald’s stores more often. 
Fig. 8.  McDelivery Staff. 
 
Fig. 7.  McDonald’s App. 













IV. McCafé         
 Taking advantage of the pre-existent infrastructures, the company has been 
working to improve its offer through a specialized coffee shop with fair price 
points. Breakfast and coffee markets are very competitive with major players like 
Starbucks or Dunkin’ Donuts. According to Euromonitor International1, in 2017 
McCafé owned 8% of the market share in Western Europe and 19% of the market 
share in Australasia, regarding the specialist coffee shop category. Still, in order 
to gain more market share, McDonald’s is betting on sustainability and value 
deals i.e. The company expects 100% of their coffee to be 100% from  
sustainable sources in 2020.  Sustainability is good, but allied with value deals 
like $2 for a small McCafé drink or $1 for a drip coffee definitely is inviting for 
customers on a budget. According to Euromonitor, McCafé is leader in Germany, 
Australia and Brazil and number two in China and Italy for the coffee category.  
 
V. Technology 
 McDonald’s is testing provisioning with automated voiced and personalized 
service in the drive-thru for some restaurants to decrease waiting lines in drive-
thru and to provide a better experience for the customer.  In 2019, McDonald’s 
acquired Dynamic Yield for $300 million and Apprente for an undisclosed amount. 
The first is a platform that uses data and real-time information to personalize the 
experience of the customer and the second is a start-up that has been building 
conversational agents that can automate voice-based ordering in multiple 
languages. With the new technology McDonald’s could personalize user 
experience as deep as offering discounts based on purchased items, weather or 
geographic location. As of the end of the third quarter of 2019, dynamic yield 
technology was already incorporated in 9,500 US drive-thru and the objective is 
to further implement this technology in the mobile app and self-ordering kiosks.  
 
VI. Sustainability 
The company has identified five critical areas: packaging and recycling, climate 
action, beef sustainability, youth opportunity and commitment to families.  In 2018, 
McDonald’s re-launched its sustainability platform with “Better M” initiative, in 
which the company set the goal to reduce/remove plastic usage from restaurants, 
while increasing recyclability without compromising the packaging recognized 
worldwide. For example, only in France, 1,200 tonnes of plastic would be saved 
by introducing fibre lid in all beverage’s cups, while, in Germany, customers are 
encouraged to bring reusable bottles to the restaurants under the “ReCup” 
 
1 “McDonald’s Corp in Consumer Foodservice (World)”, by Stephen Dutton 
Fig. 11.  McDonalds’s Acquisitions:  
Dynamic Yield and Apprente.  









2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of Stores
US Stores FMC Stores ILM Stores HGM Stores
 
 








programme. McDonald’s, together with Starbucks, also makes part of the “Next 
Generation Cup Consortium” encouraging innovation in cups development. “Scale 
for Good” or efforts on “Edible Packaging” are other initiatives tackling customer 
concerns on health and on sustainability. This echoes the brand strategy in 
building deeper ties with its customers, more than simply offering convenience 
and tastiness. McDonalds is committed into developing a sustained relationship 
between the customer and the brand. 
Financials 
 For the last couple of years Easterbrook’s plans have been a success: (1) The 
percentage of franchised restaurants increased from 82%, in 2014, to 93%, in 
2018; (2) Operating margin increased from 29% to 42% driven by more franchised 
restaurants with better operating margins; (3) The number of restaurants 
increased by 1,597 (net), as a result of 5,541 additional franchised stores and a 
decrease of 3,944 in company-operated restaurants, for the same period of 
analysis; (4) Systemwide sales increased 9.5% ($8,361 billion) enhanced by 
franchising, which alone improved 24% ($16,517 billion) from 2014 to 2018; (5) 
Comparable sales improved from -1%, in 2014, to 4.5%, in 2018, having been 
5.90% in the last Q3 of 2019 (figures 13 and 14). This means that, not only the 
company was able to open more stores, but also each store is selling more with a 
higher price/mix. Note that comparable sales have been driven by price mix’s 
upward trend since 2014, even though the number of guests is also experiencing 
an upward trend since VGP has been implemented.  
Even though total revenues decreased $6.416 billions, in the period of analysis 
(figure 12), the portion coming from franchised restaurants increased $1.74 
billions - explained, in part, by the re-franchising program which has been 
contributing to the increase of the share coming from franchisees, while revenue 
from company operated stores has been reducing as a consequence of the 
decrease in the number of company-operated stores. Still, Revenue decrease has 
been partially offset by the increase in the number of total stores and positive 
comparable sales. 
From the four segments – United States (US), International Lead Markets 
(ILM), High Growth Markets (HGM) and Foundational Markets & Corporate (FMC) 
- the most represented in number of stores is the US, which has 37% of total 
stores, while HGM is the revenues leader, having contributed with 42% of total 
revenues (figure 15).  The four segments have different franchising percentages, 
as of 2018 year-end, US was 95% franchised, ILM was 88% franchised, HGM was 
83% franchised and FMC was 98% franchised. As the long-term objective is to be 
Fig. 12.  Franchised Revenues and 
Operating Margin as % Revenues. 
Source: Company Reports. 
Fig. 13.  McDonald’s Comparable Sales, 
Price Mix and Guest Counts Evolution. 
Source: Company Reports.  
Fig. 14. Reported Comparable Sales Evolution. 
Source: Company Report.  
Fig. 15. Revenues by Segment.  
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95% overall franchised, meaning that some segments are already at that point, 
while others will continue re-franchising. 
Economic Outlook 
Ranking top ten on FT’s Top 100 Global Brands and Forbes’ World’s Most 
Valuable Brands, in 2019, McDonalds is undoubtfully one of the most global 
companies worldwide. Taking advantage of the company extended presence, in 
1986, The Economist launched the Big Mac Index as an attempt to access 
purchasing power parity disparities across regions, using the price of the Big Mac 
as the benchmark. However, even though the scale is crucial for the business, 
being international at this extent echoes operational, reputational and economic 
risks. McDonald’s is exposed to local economic swings, currency fluctuations, 
infrastructures quality levels, domestic policies and cultural sensibility. 
In a global scenario, growth is in a synchronized slowdown, forecasted to be 
3% in 2019, the slowest pace since 2008’s Financial Crisis (IMF, Oct 19). 
Moreover, US-China trade war is estimated to cumulatively reduce the global GDP 
by 0.8 p.p., already in 2020. Political tensions in emerging markets such as in 
Latin America - Chile, Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina, and in Middle East, still living 
under frictions, threat growth prospects in the regions. 
Additionally, according to Damodaran, the Restaurant Industry had a beta 
levered of 0.8, between 2015 and 2019, meaning that there’s a positively strong 
correlation between the industry and uncontrollable events. However, when 
looking to McDonald’s peers, from 2014 until 2019, the beta levered falls in 
between 0.47 and 1.24, being 0.42 for McDonald’s (figure 17). This strengthens 
the company position regarding adverse scenarios, since it is 5 basis points below 
the second well positioned peer. Moreover, the company strategy regarding 
franchising ends up transferring part of the risks in each location, while allowing 
for a deeper adaptability to local markets. 
In developed economies, low productivity growth and aging demographics 
exposes the company to monetary policy decisions and to target inflation 
expectations. 
In the beginning 2019, Easterbrook, previous CEO, signed a letter to UK 
parliament warning the rise in food prices would be unavoidable in a context of a 
Brexit, enhancing to investors that “Consumer uncertainty is growing, from France 
to China to the UK and elsewhere across the globe in response to tightening 
economies and shifting political environments”. Brexit consequences are 
unknown, complicating the situation for McDonald’s, which owes part of its 
success in Europe to its UK restaurants. According to Bernstein Research, early 






























Fig. 17.  McDonald’s Comparables Levered 
Beta. 
Source: Bloomberg and Analysts estimates. 
Fig. 16.  Real GDP Growth and 
forecasts 
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originated in Europe. Under EOTF transformation, International Lead Markets, 
segment in which the UK is inserted, saw an increase of 5.2% in comparable 
sales, however, political environment may compromise the way company 
operates in the location. 
Additionally, the fight over climate change, which already has been discussed 
at a decision level, presents multiple challenges to the company. McDonald’s is 
struggling regarding plastic usage and its disposable packaging model in an 
increasingly conscious eco-friendly global economy. According to Financial 
Time’s, McDonald’s, together with Starbucks, already spent $15 million in a 
partnership with Closed Loop Partners to pursue sustainable investments.  
Industry Outlook 
In generic terms, the Restaurant Industry is divided into three main categories: 
Quick Service Restaurants (QSR) – fast food service, low-cost food at fair quality, 
up to $8, Casual Dining Restaurants (CSR) – differentiated quality,  enjoyable 
atmosphere, price ranging from $15, and the Quick/Fast Casual Restaurants 
(QCR), which lies in between. McDonald’s Corporation owns, by operating and 
franchising, restaurants in the QSR Industry targeting the Informal Eating Out2 
(IEO) layer of the market. 
In a very compettive market, scale matters. At a time in which the number of 
guest counts are at low rates, global fast-food companies have beeen intaking 
aggressive discount strategies, despite rising labour costs and commodity 
inflation. This strategy has been attracting new layers of the market like low-
income consumers, while industry oversupply and rising concerns regarding 
health care have been shifting Millenials to other options in the Fast Casual 
segment. The global QSR Industry is expected to grow at 7.61% CAGR, between 
2019 and 2026, according to Big Market Research, boosted by delivery, digital 
and consumer data.  
Also, the Restaurant Finance Monitor Index, which improved 16% year-to-date 
(June 2019), surpassed the 15% of the S&P composite index driven by heavily 
weighted companies of the sector such as McDonalds, Starbucks, Chipotle, which 
have been benefiting from the momentum in stock market, rather than company-
specifics (Bloomberg Intelligence). 
US, Canada, Australia, UK, Hong Kong/China, Japan and New Zealand were 
the top markets, in per capita value spending, in the QSR industry for the year of 
2018, according to Euromonitor. Households spent, on average, between $500 to 
 
2 The IEO includes: “casual dining full-service restaurants, street stalls or kiosks, cafés, delivery/ takeaways providers, specialist coffee 
shops, self-service cafeterias and juice/smoothies’ bars”. – Passport Euromonitor 
Fig. 17.  US’s Sales Leading Brands 
2012-2017.  
Source: Passport Euromonitor.   
 
 








$800. The market size for QSR is forecasted to grow at 3.6% CAGR in Eastern 
Europe, 2% CAGR in Western Europe, 2.6% CAGR in Australasia and 4% CAGR 
in Latin America, between 2017 and 2022 (Source: Statista).  
Technology has been allowing chains to curb the practice of deep dicounting 
and, more than that, to superior data collection regarding consumers preferences. 
Mobile Apps, self-order kiosks, order platforms and payment aplications have 
been helping chains to address customer needs, bring convenience and 
improving their satisfaction (figure 18). 
Delivery has been driven by partnerships to accelerate the process, however, 
even though this strategy allows for rapid organic growth, the typical fee structure 
is still very narrow (between 20%-30%) not being sustainable in the long term. 
Moreover, the lack of company control to elevate the brand over deliveries is 
almost none, as proven in a study conducted by SeeLevel Hx where 51% of the 
inquirees alleged to have negative experiences with deliver. Still, as we can see 
from figure 19, home delivery is a growing industry and McDonald’s is well 
positioned to take a major steak of the cake. 
United States 
North America is undoubtedly the strongest market for fast-food industry, both 
in fast-food meals and in cafeteria services, with a respective CAGR of nearly 
2.5% in meals and 3% in coffee shop services, with sales volume above $260 
billions in food and $26 billions in cafeteria. Also, according to Zion Market 
Research, the QSR industry in the US was capped in nearly $540 billion, in 2016, 
and it is expected to achieve $690 billion in value in 2022, which corresponds to 
a CAGR of nearly 4.20% over 2016-2022. In order to increase in-store traffic, as 
well as to capture other segments of the market such as low-income consumers, 
more sensitive to the price, fast food chains had entered in a massive price war in 
which McDonalds followed the trend launching in January 2018 the dollar menu. 
Taco Bell, KFC and Wendy’s are some of the names within the competitors. In a 
context in which there is customer demand for new approaches to in-store 
experiences, reengineering facilities with user-technology to bring brand 
excitement as well as to increase efficiency becomes a priority. Delivering 
convenience through traffic management in a margin squeeze context highlighted 
the need of transformation in the industry. Moreover, concerns regarding food 
quality over millennials and public health alarms rang the bell to reinforce 
premium-sandwiches, such as shack-and-shack, as local casual dining is 
evolving. 
Europe 
The region is shifting from the tradition dinning culture to convenient and 
flexible options. Even though the differences in market size, predictable growth, 
Fig. 19.  Home Delivery sales from Limited 
Service Restaurants in US 
Source: Statista.  
Fig. 18.  American Customer Satisfaction 
Index Scores for Limited Services Restaurant 
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size of the economy and country-specific characteristics, the food landscape in 
Europe has been affected by the same trends as North America. Also, it is 
important to bear in mind that 44% of the restaurant sales in US are absorbed by 
fast food chains, in Europe the share falls between 5% to 13%.  To note that 
European main market are UK, Germany, Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, where burgers are the most popular category and where 
there’s a collective demand for quality and premium. Moreover, according to 
Aaron Allen Global Restaurants Consultants, only in Western locations, fast-food 
market is expected to increase $10.3 billion in the next three years.  
China   
As income is rising in China, the region became a trend setter in foodservice 
market in which chicken-based meals are preferable to the beef-based menu, 
McDonalds’s speciality. International chains have been struggling in a market 
where domestic supply is prepared to fulfil demand. Still, since the beginning, 
McDonalds was never capable of surpassing YUM! Brands, namely KFC and 
Pizza Hut, that benefited from early-move competitive advantage. Western 
influence in the region has boosted demand for fast food: according to ACMR-
IBISWorld, in 2019, China is expected to generate $178 bn, an increase of 7.8% 
in comparison with 2018.  Moreover, for the next five years, the revenue of the 
industry is expected to growth at 8.9% CAGR, over the 2.4 million restaurants.  
McDonald’s Comparables 
McDonald’s is primarily a franchisor with 93% of the stores under this scheme, 
in 2018’s year-end, with the remaining 7% (equivalent to 2,770 million stores) 
remaining under company operations, aiming to achieve 95% franchising 
structure in the long-term. The company had a market cap of nearly $149 billion, 
as year-end 2018, with an average price per share of $194. The brand value is 
estimated to be $130 millions (2019, Statista), placing McDonald’s as one of the 
most valuable brands worldwide. In 2018 fiscal year, the company billed $96.14 
billion in Sales in more than 37,000 stores over 100 locations. US, alone, 




Restaurants Brands International operates in the QSR industry, counting more 
than 26,000 outlets in over 100 locations. The company operates under three 
independent brands: Burger King (1954), Tim Hortons (1964, Canada) and 
Popeyes (1972, US). Burger King has a fully franchised business model directly 
competing with McDonald’s either in the products offering, target audience and 
Fig. 20.  McDonald’s Logo. 
 
















Founded in 1971, and public since 1992, Starbucks is the world’s leading 
coffeehouse chain, counting 30,000 stores over 80 markets (2019, June). The 
company’s offers handcrafted premium beverages and coffees, merchandise and 
fresh bakeries driven by high quality and price point. At year-end 2018, 70% of 
the sales were from beverages, while 20% from food. Company achieved $5.7 
billion in Revenues, owning 100% of US operations, while partially franchising in 
other geographies.  
 
Yum! Brands 
Yum was created as a spin-off of PepsiCo in 1997. It is composed by three 
main restaurant brands: KFC - chicken-specialized products, Pizza Hut - casual 
dining ready-to-eat/delivery pizza and Taco Bell - Mexican-style food products. 
The group manages 49,000 restaurants worldwide, 98% franchised with over $49 
billion in systemwide sales (2018). In numbers, the group is the closest competitor 
to McDonald’s, however this is only possible due to the sum of the parts. 
 
Wendy’s 
Founded in 1969, Wendy’s is the third largest quick-service restaurant 
company in the hamburger sandwich segment. The company has 6,700 
restaurants (year-end 2018), with 95% franchised, over 30 countries. Systemwide 
sales were around $10.5 billions in year-end 2018, equivalent to one tenth of 
McDonald’s sales. Although the considerably lower dimension, the 
products/services’ offering and business model (95% - 5% McDonald’s target), 
makes it a suitable comparable.  
 
Domino’s Pizza 
Domino’s Pizza, Inc. is the leading pizza delivery company and the second 
largest pizza franchise after Yum!. The business is organized into US, 
international franchise and supply chain. The company is primarily a franchisor 
owning 15,900 stores, from which 10,038 were internationally franchised. As year-
end 2018, Domino’s was in 85 markets. In 2018, the company billed $3.4 billion, 
reflecting its investments efforts in technology to improve customer experience. 
 
Dunkin’ Brands 
Dunkin’ Brands is an American multinational coffee/donut company founded 
in 1948 that operates under: Dunkin’ and Baskin-Robins brands, specialized in 
ice-cream. The company offers a wide variety of coffee beverages and baked 
Fig. 22.  Starbucks Logo. 
 
 
Fig. 24. Wendy’s Logo. 
 
Fig. 25. Domino’s Pizza Logo. 
 
Fig. 26. Dunkin’ Brands Logo. 
   












goods in more than 20,900 outlets over 60 countries worldwide, 100% franchised. 
As of 2018’s fiscal year, 76% of systemwide sales ($8.8 billion) were from US, 
while the remaining $2.2 billion came primarily from the Asian and the Middle 
East’s franchises. 
 
In the table below we can observe additional key financial information for 












We believe that 2025 will be the year in which the VGP will mature, as by then, 
the 3 pillars will be already established in McDonald’s system, for at least 1 or 2 
years (management expects to have EOTF systemwide in 2022). With the 
Turnaround Plan in 2015 the company set a long-term objective of having 95% of 
the stores franchised, which, according to our forecasts is expectable to happen 
in 2024. Additionally, until the target is accomplished, company-operated stores 
are expected to decrease, on average, 4% until 2024, either because of re-
franchising or closing. From 2024 onwards, we predicted modest growth (about 
1%) while maintaining the ratio of 95% franchised to 5% company-operated. As 
we expect comparable sales to be lower  in the future, revenues will then depend 
more on the growth of number of stores, and not so much on sales per store. 
Therefore, for clarification purposes, in order to value the company, one 
considered two key metrics: number of stores and sales per store. In order to 
forecast the number of stores and comparable sales for the future we took into 
account historical performance, management prespectives and available 
information on each segment.  
 
Revenue 
Franchised sales do not have a direct conversion to franchised revenues, 
since those last depend on contract terms which are different on the type of 
franchise, on the country and on the type of agreement between the two parts.In 
Fig. 27.  McDonald’s and Comparable company’s financial information and multiples. 
Source: Bloomberg and Company Report. 
 




Dunkin' Donuts Domino's Pizza
Revenues (m$) 21025,2 5688,0 24719,5 1589,9 5357,0 1321,6 3432,9
EBITDA (m$) 10450,2 2433,0 5189,2 378,8 2097,0 456,9 625,4
Net Income (m$) 5924,3 1542,0 4518,3 460,1 612,0 229,9 362,0
Market Cap (m$) 170504,1 28706,8 79894,6 3696,0 23970,2 5296,1 11535,0
EPS ($) 7,7 4,8 3,3 1,9 2,5 2,8 8,7
D/E (%) 8% 34% 1% 64% 47% 48% 30%
% Franchised (%) 93% 98% 48% 95% 100% 100% 98%
EPS 7,7x 5,0x 3,5x 2,0x 2,4x 2,8x 8,8x
EV/Revenues 8,7x 6,8x 3,3x 3,8x 6,6x 5,9x 4,0x
EV/EBITDA 17,6x 15,8x 15,5x 16,0x 16,8x 17,0x 22,2x
EV/EBIT 20,5x 16,8x 20,7x 24,2x 18,4x 18,9x 24,3x
EV/NETINCOME 31,0x 25,0x 17,8x 13,1x 57,5x 33,8x 38,4x
P/E 28,8x 18,2x 18,7x 7,8x 21,5x 22,8x 28,3x
P/S 8,1x 4,9x 3,4x 2,3x 2,5x 4,0x 3,0x
 
 








our analysis, we took into consideration two effects: the historic percentage of 
revenues over sales per segment and the percentage of franchised stores. First, 
we believe that sales is the best driver for franchised revenues because rent and 
royalties depend on sales. Second, the historic percentage of revenues over sales 
for the past is a fair enough estimator available in this context. Looking to the 
history, the higher the percentage of franchised restaurants in the segment, the 
lower the revenues of those restaurants as percentage of sales. Taking this into 
account, we used historical values for segments that were 95% franchised and 
discounted the ones that weren’t yet 95% franchised until they reach the long-term 
objective. 
 
Sales per Store 
Systemwide sales represent all the sales within the system (company-
operated and franchised), which, according to the company Annual Report, is 
expected to grow 3% to 5% in the long-term. For the next six years (until 2024) 
we forecasted systemwide sales to grow, on average, 3.5% mainly driven by 
HGM, which are expected to increase 5.6%, whereas ILM and FMC will grow 
around 3.9% and US 1.7%. 
Sales per Store (SpS) were estimated based on the previous year SpS 
adjusted for the current year comparable sales. Note that comparable sales 
correspond to the annual sales variation of each store opened by more than 13 
months3, and it represents the combination of guests counts and price mix. For 
clarification purposes: “Guest Counts” are the change in the number of 
transactions compared with the previous period and “Price Mix” is the difference 















3 In this context it was assumed the growth to be equal for every store, by default. 
Fig. 29.  Sales per Store by Segment in millions of dollars.   
Source: Company Report and Analysts Estimates. 
Fig. 28.  Systemwide Sales and Segment Revenues in millions of dollars. 
Source: Company Report and Analysts Estimates. 
Millions of $ 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
Systemwide Sales 87 786 82 714 85 002 90 910 96 147 101 263 104 831 108 372 111 600 114 841 118 018
US Revenues 7 666 7 871 7 965 8 073 8 183 8 307 8 432 8 534 8 637 8 741 8 845
ILM Revenues 7 600 7 540 7 270 7 179 7 055 7 074 7 284 7 443 7 568 7 656 7 745
HGM Revenues 3 989 3 755 3 509 3 356 3 226 3 069 2 840 2 942 3 046 3 136 3 227
FMC Revenues 1 771 2 083 2 411 2 755 3 107 3 464 3 839 3 960 4 045 4 090 4 136
Sales per Store (m$) 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
US Company 3,9 4,0 4,0 4,1 4,1 4,1 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,3 4,3
US Franchised 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 2,9 2,9 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,0
ILM Company 4,9 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,1 6,1 6,2
ILM Franchised 3,4 3,6 3,7 3,9 3,9 4,0 4,1 4,2 4,2 4,3 4,3
HGM Company 2,6 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,0 3,1 3,1 3,2 3,2 3,2
HGM Franchised 1,9 2,0 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,3 2,3 2,3
FMC Company 3,0 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 3,9 3,9 4,0
FMC Franchised 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4
 
 









In 2018, the US segment surpassed the company long-term objective by being 
95,1% franchised. The number of stores have been decreasing 200, on average, 
per year, since 2015, driven by the decrease in company-operated stores.  Still, 
in the long term, in order to succeed, and in accordance with the company 
“convenience” purpose, we believe McDonald’s will continue to slowly expand the 
number of stores for the segment, either by openning solely pick-up stores or 
indepent McCafé brunches. Guest counts have been ranging from -4% to 1%, 
since 2014, with the exception being 2017 (figure 30), evidenciating a negative 
tendency in the number of transactions. However, by 2024, we believe this 
tendency will invert with all the company efforts to encourage repetead purchases 
under the Velocity Growth Plan. Moreover, fierce competition in the QSR industry 
forced McDonald’s to engage in promotions and meals at affordable prices, still 
price/mix has been unterruptly expanding, mainly driven by the increases in menu 
prices and by delivery higher average check. We can also observe on figure 31 
that consumers are spending more on the QSR industry, which can also explain 
the increases in the price/mix. Even so, we believe its will peak in 2019 and will 
decrease afterwards, stabilizing after 2025. The reason for our expectation is 
momentum: as the company launched delivery, there was an increasing hype; but 
as the number of stores offering delivery stabilizes and as peers will take more 
attention to the potencial of delivery, the hype will also decrease, competition will 
increase and price/mix will slowdown.  
 
International Lead Markets 
International Lead Markets represents countries where McDonald’s is already 
well established. McDonald's is market leader in the UK, France, Germany, 
Australia and number two in Canada. We consider to maintain its leadership, as 
well as to meet the company’s franchising long-term target, there will be incentives 
to continue to expand even further the number of stores. Only in France, the 
company expects to open around 400-500 stores, by 2025. As of year-end 2018, 
McDonald’s operated 816 stores and franchised 6,171 stores, which corresponds 
to a 88.3% structure franchised. We believe the company will be able to meet its 
target  in 2023, mainly driven by the reduction in company-operated stores (at an 
average rate of 14% until 2023) while slightly increasing the number of 
franchisees, at an average rate of 2%, for the same period of analysis (figure 32). 
Furthermore, as EOTF reaches all the stores, the hype over the new restaurants 
will fade away and competitiors most problably also will add self-order kiosks, 
revamp their stores, so, in the long-term, comparable sales will most likely lower.  
Fig. 30.  US Comparable Sales Evolution. 
Source: Bloomberg and Analysts Estimates.  
Fig. 32.  ILM Stores.  
Source: Bloomberg and Analysts Estimates. 
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US Consumer Spending in QSR 
 
 








The price mix has been high for International Lead Markets (figure 33), mostly 
due to the expansion of the delivery in Europe and Australia, fueled by the 
partnership with UberEats. In the Annual Report of 2018, the company stated that 
France and the UK had double digit sales increase in delivery, also mentioning 
that those purchases have 1.5 to 2 times higher average price per transaction. As 
a significant part of the orders are done late at night, it was observerd that 
consumers are willing to spend more, thus contributing to the increase in price 
mix. Moreover, concerns regarding food quality and sustainability are expected to 
increase and quality will be most likely to be reflected into menu’s price increase. 
We believe price mix will continue to be positive but at a slower pace, as the 
company needs to accommodate quickly consumers requests, in a context where 
there isn't a consolidated delivery system besides outsources like Uber Eats and 
where environmental issues regarding the menu are not solutioned yet. Also, the 
idea of catching up high segments made the company launch "McDonalds 
Signature" offering premium burgers with more quality at higher prices. As 
demand for premium burgers increases in Europe, this leads to an average higher 
price mix. However, as the excitement of digital goes by and delivery reaches all 
the markets, we believe that price mix will slow down.  
 
High Growth Markets 
High Growth Markets are composed by countries in which McDonald's isn't yet 
fully established, being the main markets China, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Poland, 
Russia, Spain, Switzerland, and related markets. Only 82.7% of the restaurants 
are franchised in the segment and we expect that the target of 95% to be achieved 
in 2024 (figure 34). Between 2013 and 2018, McDonald's sales historic CAGR 
have been around 3.8% in Western Europe, 7.8% in Latin America, 10% in Middle 
East and Africa and around 5.3% in Asia Pacific (Euromonitor). Also,  according 
to the same source, China is forwarded to be McCafé's largest contributor to 
growth as the proliferation of coffee consumption in China's middle class is 
expanding. We believe that this growth can only be sustained by the constant 
increase in the number of stores, mainly franchisings, while repassing company-
operated restaurants. The number of stores have been growing close to 5.5% per 
year (320 stores/year). In 2019, half of the total stores that the company expected 
to open were located in China, meaning that we should observe an aggressive 
increase in 2019, compared with the previous years. Therefore we estimated 400 
new net stores, in 2019, for this segment. 
With the delivery success across HGM, specially in China, and with the 
integration of the app WeChat, we believe that price mix will be 2.5% in 2020 
(figure 35) and will start decreasing as EOTF and digital become more common 
Fig. 33.  ILM Comparable Sales.  
Source: Bloomberg and Analysts 
Estimates. 
Fig. 34.  HGM Stores.  
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Fig. 35.  HGM Comparable Sales.  
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not only in the McDonald’s stores but also in its peers.. In terms of guest count, it 
has been negative in the past with a sudden recovery in 2017. From 2014 to 2016, 
guest counts have been negative, increasing by 1.8%, in 2017 and 2018.  
Specially in Asia, coffe shops have a lot of traffic and McDonald's is able to 
leverage McCafé to drive guest counts higher while revamping stores to increase 
visits.  
 
Foundational Markets and Corporate  
This segment is composed by dispersed markets, in which the most relevant 
are Brazil, Japan, Taiwan, Phillippines and also where the firm reports corporate 
activity. In 2018 this segment was already 98% franchised, unlike the others, 
making us believe that this value will revert to the 95% in the long-term (figure 36). 
The number of stores have been increasing slightly and we believe it will 
continue that way because this segment is neither the high growth and neither the 
stablished market, it is composed by fragmented markets that are not expected to 
grow much. Guest counts increased to positive territory in 2016 due to the 
effectiveness of the velocity growth plan.  
Brazil responded very well to the EOTF and self-ordering kiosks, specially 
because it happened after the crisis, in 2014, where people had to spend with 
caution and McDonald’s appeared with affordable and convenient meals. Also, in 
Phillippines McDonald's launched NXTGEN stores that feature modern design, 
self-ordering kiosks and cashless payments. The success was obvious and there 
are more stores opening in the following years. All of this contributes to positive 
guest counts. 
Price mix has been very high since 2014 (figure 37), even before the effect of 
the Turnaround Plan in 2015. This puts the baseline very high and much above 
the baseline of the other segments. This may be explained by the sales per store 
which is only $1.89 million in 2018 versus $3.57 million in HGM, for example. We 
believe that, as delivery expands to more markets and as the digital app gets to 
more customers, there will be higher spending per visit. It also makes sense that 
sales per store converges with other segments and for that to happen, comparable 
sales have to be higher than the other segments. 
 
Operating Margin Analysis 
In order to analyse the cost structure of the company it is important to look to 
company-operated and franchised restaurants separately, since both have 
different margins structure. Still, there are cost such as SG&A that affect both the 
company-operated and franchised restaurants. In company-operated restaurants 
there are 3 types of costs (figure 38): “Food and Paper”, “Payroll and Employee 
Fig. 37.  FMC Comparable Sales.  
Source: Bloomberg and Analysts Estimates. 
Fig. 36.  FMC Stores.  
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benefits” and “Other Occupancy and Operating Expenses”, while, for franchises, 
there are only “Occupancy Expenses” (figure 41).  
 
Food and Paper 
Food and Paper costs are tied with a basket of 10 commodities that represent 
75% of those costs. We gathered data from World Bank on some commodities 
that we believe to be representative of the costs of McDonald’s (figure 39). We 
can observe that in 2019 most of the commodities are expected to go down, 
however, the company announced in the quarterly reports that Food and Paper 
are expected to increase around 2% to 3% in 2019. We believe that the change 
behind this increase is the beef price, which is expected to increase 8%, in 2019. 
From 2019 onwards the commodities increase at around 2% but beef, one of the 
main commodities, decreases at 1% a year, on nominal prices. Taking into 
account that revenues increase already takes into account inflation (through 
price/mix), we expect Food and Paper, as percentage of company-operated 
Revenues, to be constant from 2019 onwards.  
 
Payroll and employee benefits 
In order to estimate Payroll and employee benefits we related this cost with 
the number of employees working for the company (figure 40). The number of 
employees is mainly related with company-operated restaurants and that’s why it 
has been decreasing over the last years and we still forecast a further reduction 
until the company becomes 95% franchised. We also forecasted the payroll and 
employee benefit per employee to increase slightly in the future because of 
competitive labour market and pressures on wage increases. According with the 
Financial Times article “Rising global labour costs poised to hit equity markets”, 
by Steve Johnson, global unemployment has fallen to its lowest level since 1970; 
Due to this fact, the labour market has become increasingly competitive and the 
growth in productivity is no longer higher than the growth in wages like it used to 
be in the past. The trend we are observing now is more share of GDP going 
towards employees and less share of GDP going towards companies. Hence, we 
believe that in the long-term this trend will continue and raise the payroll costs. 
 
Other occupancy and operating expenses 
 Other occupancy and operating expenses are related with depreciation, lease 
expenses and other occupancy costs that company-operated restaurants incur. 
Briefly, in order to forecast these costs, we compared them on a per store level 
over the past years and we forecasted what those per store costs would be in the 
future. In figure 41, we observe that these costs have been decreasing, but we 
expect them to go up as percentage of company-operated revenues, since we 
Fig. 39.  Commodities nominal growth rate. 
Source: World Bank. 
Fig.40.  Payroll and Number of Employee 
evolution. 
Source: Company Report and Analysts 
Estimates. 
Fig.38.  Cost as % of Revenues Evolution.   
Source: Company Reports and Analysts 
Estimates.  
2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E
Crude oil, avg -12% -3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Coffee, Arabica -4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Coffee, Robusta -13% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Wheat, US, HRW -5% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Meat, beef 8% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1% -1%
Meat, chicken -11% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Cocoa 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Sugar 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Fig. 41.  Company-Operated Occupancy 
Expenses as % of Revenues. 
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believe the decrease was artificially generated in response to high number of 
closed company-operated stores, which is expected to return to previous levels in 
the long term. Also, as we can observe on figure 42, the global real house index 
has been increasing which mean that the tendency is for lease expenses to 
continue to go up as real estate also gets more expensive, especially in big cities. 
 
Franchised occupancy expenses 
From McDonald’s perspective, franchised restaurants only have one 
associated cost: the occupancy expense. In this line it is included depreciation 
from franchised restaurants, leases expense and other occupancy operating 
expenses. We compared these costs with the revenue from franchised restaurants 
in order to understand how the margin has changed (figure 43). We can see that 
these costs represent about 15% to 16% of franchised revenues and we estimate 
that, in the long run, these costs will increase slightly in relative terms. Additionally, 
according to the International Monetary Fund (figure 42), the real house index has 
been increasing in the past years and we believe this trend will continue, 
especially on less developed countries, leading occupancy costs to increase and 
thus decrease McDonald’s margins.  
 
Selling, General and Administrative (SG&A)  
The company refers in its annual reports that SG&A should be benchmarked 
with total revenues (figure 44) because it relates with both company-operated and 
franchised restaurants. We forecasted these costs to increase slightly in the 
following years as a percentage of total revenues since we believe the company 
will continue its strategy of acquiring new digital companies such as Apprente and 
Dynamic Yield (which are registered in SG&A). According to former CEO Steve 
Easterbrook, the next step after the investment in EOTF restaurants is to use 
software to improve the customer experience. This means that the EOTF provided 
the infrastructure necessary to create a bridge to the age of the digital, and the 
objective is to use this bridge to further improve the customer relationship with the 
brand. Furthermore, continuous investment in digital products and companies is 
the way to get the most benefit from the infrastructure already built, but that also 
requires extra spending which is registered on SG&A. 
 
Capital Expenditures 
In the last couple of years, the structure of the capital expenditure of the 
company has been changing. There are two main forms of capital expenditures: 
the growth capex, which represents the investment in new units, and the 
Fig. 43.  SG&A as percentage of total 
revenues. 
Source: Company Reports and Analysts 
Estimates 
 
Fig. 42.  Global Real House Index. 
Source: IMF. 
Fig. 44.  SG&A as percentage of total 
revenues. 
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maintenance capex, which represents the investment on current stores (including 
the EOTF re-modelling).  
From 2014 until 2018, it is observable in figure 45 that the majority of the capex 
switched from growth to maintenance capex, as a result of the high investment 
need to re-model all the restaurants for “The Experience of the Future”. We believe 
that, in the short-term, the maintenance capex will continue to be higher, as the 
company continues to re-model its restaurants. In the long run we believe that 
growth capex will catch up with maintenance capex since we believe that the 
company will continue to invest in its restaurants and implement new features and 
more technology, while also growing the number of restaurants across the system. 
 
Working Capital 
Comparing to its peers, McDonald’s seems to be doing very well in terms of 
working capital. If we look to figure 46 and 47, we conclude that while the 
comparable companies have an average of 25 days of cash conversion cycle, in 
2018, McDonald’s has -7 days, meaning that they receive from clients 7 days 
before paying to suppliers. We believe that the reason for this to happen is related 
with the bargaining power of the company in result of their operations’ volume. It 
is also observable, in figure 47, that both collecting period and payable period has 
been increasing over the period of analysis.  
We believe that, one of the possible reasons for receivables have been 
increasing over time is because, while the company re-franchises, the clients stop 
being the consumers and start being the franchisees, meaning that instead of 
receiving right on the spot, the company is now receiving in the form of rents and 
royalties that have a specific period in which they can be paid. The payable period 
had also increased, and we believe the reason for this to happen behind is even 
more bargaining power over suppliers. Although there are more franchised 
restaurants now, it is still the parent company who chooses suppliers; this might 
be giving an edge to company-operated restaurants for better terms on the 
payable period. This way, we believe that in the future McDonald’s will continue 
to outperform its peers on the cash conversion cycle, following the results 









Fig. 45.  Capital Expenditure Evolution. 
Source: Company Report and Analysts 
Estimates 
Fig. 46.  Cash Conversion Cycle. 
Source: Bloomberg and Analyst Estimates. 
Fig. 47.  Cash Conversion Cycle.  
Source: Company Reports and Analyst Estimates. 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
Collecting Period 16 18 21 28 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Holding Period 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Payable Period 21 23 24 30 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47




















Collecting Period 25 35 6 47 22 33
Holding Period 1 1 10 77 4 2
Payable Period 5 14 9 68 6 13


































































In the past few years McDonald’s has been loading on debt, mainly using it for 
stock repurchasing and dividend payments. Even though the company generates 
enough cash flow to return cash to shareholders, it doesn’t generate enough for 
the amount of stock that the company has been repurchasing. From figure 48 it is 
observable that net debt almost tripled from $13 billions, in 2014, to $30 billions, 
in 2018. Although this aggressive strategy has been paying up, raising the stock 
price from $94 a share, in January 2014, to nearly $180, in December 2018, is 
something that we consider dangerous, since the debt has been mainly used to 
return cash to shareholders and not to grow the business (through even more 
investment). In November 2015 Moody’s downgraded the rating of McDonald’s 
from A3 to Baa1 after the company announcement that it would return $30 billions 
to shareholders from 2014 until 2016, where previous shareholder return targets 
were around $20 billions. Moody’s also described that ratios of debt to EBITDA 
below 3.25x and EBIT to interest above 6x would result in a future upgrade to the 
rating. On the other hand, a level below 3.75x debt to EBITDA and EBIT to interest 
close to 4x would result in a further downgrade to the rating.  We believe that, in 
the long-term, the company will meet the ratios required to return to its previous 
rating (A3), and therefore We fixed the debt to EBITDA in 3.21x level. 
Consequently, the interest coverage ratio is expected to be around 8x (figure 49). 
The debt to EBITDA ratio of 3.21x is the expected for 2019 taking into account the 
target of $25 billions that the company should be returning to its shareholders from 
2016 until 2019 through stock repurchases and dividends.  The debt ratios target 
that we estimated will, however, require less future stock buybacks. Even so, we 
believe that the board of McDonald’s wouldn’t allow for such a prestigious 
company to be downgraded to a junk bond. 
 
Shareholder Structure 
As of 2019’s January 31, the number of shareholders of record and beneficial 
owners of the Company’s stock was estimated to be 2,150,000. Due to its sizable 
market cap, volume in operations and international character of revenues, 
McDonald’s assumes a significant role in the industry integrating some of the most 
relevant indexes: the Dow Jones Industrial/Composite Average (DJIA/DJCA), 
S&P 100, S&P 500 and S&P 500 Consumer Discretionary. McDonald’s stock 
clearly outperforms the S&P 500 and DJIA, from 2014 to 2019 (figure 49), which 
can be explained, in part, by the company efforts on returning money to 
shareholders either through dividends payment on common stock, either from 
stock repurchasing, increasing in value of the company’s shares. In 2019 it was 
Fig. 49.  McDonald’s Debt Ratios.   
Source: Company Report and Analysts 
Estimates  
Fig. 48.  McDonald’s Net Debt.   
Source: Company Report and Analysts 
Estimates  
Fig. 50.  Cumulative Return.   
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already announced a further rise of 8% to the quarterly dividend (to $1.25 per 







Dividends and Stock Repurchases 
As said before, the company has been leveraging up in order to further 
repurchase more of its own stock. In figure 52, we can observe that, since 2017, 
the company has been repurchasing at an upward pace, being expectable to do 
the same in 2019, up to $6 bn. To note that this decision regarding stock 
repurchasing not only contributes to the increase of the value per share, but also 
contributes for the reduction of the number of shares (and thus the dividends that 
the company pays). McDonald’s has increased its dividend for 43 consecutive 
years and stop would be a bad sign to the market and deteriorate investors’ 
expectations. Therefore, with this strategy pursuit by the company, it was possible 
to reduce the payout ratio from 70%, in 2015, to 55%, in 2018, while still increasing 
the dividend. In the following years, we believe that stock repurchases will be 
lower in order for the company to preserve its credit rating and even upgrade it 
back to Moody’s A3 rating. In terms of the dividend payout, we think it will continue 
to decrease until it meets peers average payout ratio, which is currently on 39%. 
As the company has been announcing the money it returns to shareholders on a 
3-year period basis, we consider important to also analyse it. With our forecasts, 
it is expected that around $17.5 billions will be returned to shareholders from 2020 
until 2022, $19.3 billions from 2023 until 2025 and, finally, $21.5 billions from 2026 
until 2028 (figure 53). 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
McDonald’s Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity represents the return that shareholders require in order to 
pursue an investment. In order to estimate McDonald’s cost of equity we resorted 
to a simple Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) regression.  
We estimate the risk-free rate to be equal to 1.78% (as of 29th Nov. 19) based 
on the yield to maturity of a 10-year US treasury bond (US Generic Govt 10 Year 
Yield). We decided to use 10Y US treasury because: (1) the company is based in 
the United States and owns a considerable part of its business there; (2) the 
Fig. 52.  Dividends and Stock Repurchases. 
Source: Company Report and Analysts 
Estimates  
    
Fig. 53.  Money returned to shareholders by 
3-year periods.    
Source: Company Reports and Analysts 
Estimates  
Fig. 51.  Cumulative Return.   
Source: Company Report.  
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Shares Repurchased (milions) 33,1 61,8 92,3 31,4 32,2
Shares Outstanding at year-end (milions) 963 907 819 794 767
Dividend per share 3,28$         3,44$         3,61$         3,83$         4,19$         
Dividends Paid (million $) 3 216$       3 230$       3 058$       3 089$       3 256$       
Treasury stock purchased (million $) 3 175$       6 182$       11 142$     4 651$       5 247$       
Total Returned to shareholders 6 391$       9 412$       14 200$     7 740$       8 503$       
In Billions of $
Money Returned 
to Shareholders
2014 - 2016 30 004
2017 - 2019E 25 000
2020E - 2022E 17 496
2023E - 2022E 19 297




























































Stock Repurchases and Dividends
Stock Repurchases Payout Ratio
 
 








country has low default risk; and (3) 10 years is the maturity that best aligns with 
the cash flow streaming being valued.  
The market-risk premium estimated is equal to 5%, obtained by subtracting 
the expected return of the MSCI World Index (that includes large and mid-caps 
across 23 market representations) and the risk-free rate mentioned above. In 
2018, 36% of the company’s revenues came from the US, while the remaining 
64% came from the rest of the world, reflecting material international exposure 
and being the developed markets the ones that weight the most. This way, we 
believe that MSCI World Index is the best index and the one that better reflects 
McDonald’s risk profile. 
In order to estimate the Beta of McDonald’s we took into account different 
information: (1) Levered Beta of 0.43 obtained through the CAPM regression on 
monthly data for the last 6 years and respective 95% confidence interval equal 
to  ]0.16 ; 0.71[; (2) Peers average 2-year rolling unlevered beta (figure 54), which 
ranged from 0.32 to 0.60; (3) The average of Peers unlevered beta, through CAPM 
regression, with monthly data of the last 6 years, which resulted in an average 
Unlevered Beta of 0.51.  
The outcome was similar in the three methods, so we decided to use the last 
one, resulting in a Beta of 0.58 after re-leveraging for the company capital 
structure. Finally, after applying the CAPM formula, the result is a cost of equity 
equal to 4.76%. 
 
McDonald’s Cost of Debt 
The cost of debt was estimated based on the yield to maturity of McDonald’s 
10-year Corporate Bond in US Dollars, on the probability of default and on the loss 
given default of the company. Based on market values, the YTM of McDonald’s 
Corporate Bond 10Y is 2.65%. Furthermore, the rating associated to McDonald’s 
is Baa1 according to Moody’s, which corresponds to a probability of default of 
2.17%4 (based on Cumulative Issuer-Weighted Global Default Rates for Baa1 
rating modifier on a 10 year horizon) and loss given default of 40.1%3 (based on 
the Recovery Rate for Corporate Bonds Sr. Unsecured). After multiplying the 
probability of default and loss given default, we obtain an expected credit loss of 
0.87%. The cost of debt estimated based on the values mentioned above is 1.78%  
 
Capital Structure 
In order to analyse the capital structure of the company we estimated the book 
value of debt, the market value of equity and the value of operating leasing’s. We 
 
4  Source: Annual Default Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920 - 2017 by Moody's Investors Service 
Fig. 54.  Peer Median 2-Year Rolling Beta.  






































































believe that the company is under a significant amount of contractual operating 
leasing’s and, based on leases’ expense, on the usual life of those leasing’s and 
on the cost of debt, we estimated operating leasing’s to be $21.435 billions. For 
the value of debt, we subtracted the cash and cash equivalents from the book 
value of debt reported in the balance sheet of the annual report of 2018, hence 
obtaining a net debt of $30.209 billion. Finally, in order to estimate the market 
value of equity we multiplied the number of outstanding shares (Bloomberg, 31th 
Dec. 2019) by our estimated price per share of $225.91, resulting in a market 
value of equity equal to $170.133 billions.  
In figure 55, we can observe the evolution of debt-to-equity ratio for McDonald’s 
and its peers over the last 5 years. Although there is a clear positive trend for 
McDonald’s and its peers, we believe that in the future the levels of debt will 
stagnate for McDonald’s based on the motives mentioned on the previous chapter. 
Taking this into account, we believe that the capital structure of McDonald’s is 
close to what it is today, meaning that debt, operating leases and equity represent 
13%, 10% and 77% of the enterprise value, respectively. 
 
WACC Calculation 
With all the ingredients in place, we were finally able to calculate the weighted 
average cost of capital adjusted for leases. Assuming that operating leases are 
equivalent to debt, after applying the WACC formula, we obtained an after-tax cost 
of debt of 1.41% with a weight of 23% and a cost of equity of 4.7% with a weight 
of 77%, resulting in a WACC of 3.94%. We considered this value to be constant 
in the future for valuation purposes. 
Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Return on Invested Capital 
The return on invested capital measures how much profit is being generated 
on the investments made by the company. As it is observable on figure 56, the 
ROIC of McDonald’s increased from around 10%, in 2014, to 15%, in 2018, and 
we believe it will go further to around 16% in perpetuity. Below we decomposed 





It is clear from the figure above that the re-franchising and the tax reductions in 
the US were the key variables impacting ROIC. The re-franchising strategy 
affected ROIC because operating margin increased substantially (from 30.7%, in 
Fig. 55.  McDonald’s D/E Peers’ Median. 
Source: Bloomberg, Company Reports and 
Analysts Estimates. 
Fig. 56.  McDonald’s ROIC.    
Source: Analysts Estimates 
Fig. 57.  ROIC decomposition.  
Source: Analysts Estimates. 
ROIC Breakdown 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
(1) EBIT/Revenues 30,7% 30,7% 33,4% 38,4% 42,7% 44,6% 45,4% 46,2% 46,6% 46,8% 46,4% 46,1% 46,0% 45,9% 45,8%
(2) Revenues/Invested Capital 54,6% 52,7% 55,5% 51,5% 46,8% 46,1% 44,9% 44,5% 44,1% 44,2% 44,7% 45,1% 45,5% 45,6% 45,7%
(3) 1 - Tax Rate 61,8% 64,8% 66,2% 69,3% 74,9% 76,3% 75,9% 75,9% 75,9% 75,9% 75,9% 75,9% 75,9% 75,9% 75,9%






























































































































2014, to 42.7%, in 2019) as revenues and operating costs decreased 23% and 
37%, respectively, from 2014 until 2018. The tax reform in the US was the other 
contributor, being one of the main policies the diminution of statutory tax-rate in 
14%, from 35% to 21%, which also led the operating cash taxes to decrease 
substantially and thus increasing ROIC. Taking this into account, we believe that, 
in the long-term, ROIC will be 15.89%, slightly above of the 14.96% registered in 
2018. The reason for this is that in 2018 the company is only 93% franchised, 
meaning that operating margin is expected to increase further, translating in higher 
return on invested capital. The choice of this ROIC for the long-term, much higher 
than the WACC, is based on the impressive dimension of the company that allows 
huge economies of scale and a tremendous bargaining power with suppliers and 
a brand that is recognized worldwide and one of the most powerful in the world. 
 
Growth Rate 
 In order to estimate the growth rate of the company in perpetuity we looked 
into the growth rate of NOPLAT, the growth rate of the Core Free Cash Flow and 
the growth rate attained through the fundamental approach (figure 58). For the 
fundamental approach we multiplied the long-term investment rate, which is 
around 7.1% (according to our estimates), by the ROIC obtained, which is around 
15.89%, reaching a growth rate close to 1.1%, from 2024 to 2028, as we can see 
below in figure 58. The NOPLAT growth rate also stabilizes around 1.1% to 1.18%, 
in 2027 and 2028, respectively, while the core free cash flow stabilizes around 
0.8%, for the same period of analysis. Consequently, we believe the growth rate 
lies somewhere in between 0.8% and 1.2%, thus we decided use 1% as reference, 
for valuation purposes. Nevertheless, we also provide below a sensitivity analysis 






After using all the parameters and cashflows estimated, we were finally able to 
calculate the terminal value of the company and discount the cashflows to the 
present value. After doing so, we arrived at a $225.885 billions enterprise value. 
Then, the net financial assets were subtracted, and non-core assets added to get 
a value of $170.134 billions of equity. Dividing this value by the 753.090 million 
outstanding shares (according to Bloomberg at year-end 2019), we arrived at a 
value of $225.91 per share. 
 
Fig. 58.  Growth Analysis. 
Source: Analysts Estimates. 
2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
NOPLAT growth 0,73% 2,80% 1,96% 1,89% 1,40% 1,48% 1,68% 1,10% 1,18%
Core FCF growth 5,20% 4,04% 2,49% 5,81% 2,69% 2,00% 2,01% 0,80% 0,82%
Fundamental approach - growth rate 2,67% 2,07% 1,92% 1,85% 1,33% 1,15% 1,08% 1,04% 1,08% 1,13%
 
 









In order to make our analysis more robust, we decided to make a sensitivity 
analysis to ROIC and the growth rate. It is observable in figure 59 that the valuation 
of McDonald’s is much more sensitive to the growth rate rather than to the ROIC. 
Assuming a growth rate of 0.3%, the share price would be around $190, while at 










Our estimates and forecasts can be somewhat different from what we observe 
in reality, therefore, we made a scenario analysis to the forecasts of revenues and 
restaurant-related costs in order to understand how much the stock is susceptible 
to move with those variables. For example, in a bad scenario, if the revenues are 
lower 4% than our estimates, from 2019 onwards, and if restaurant related costs 
are higher 4%, the stock value would be $180.6. In a good scenario, if revenues 
are higher 4% than estimated and restaurant-related costs are lower 4%, the stock 









The quick service restaurants (QSR) exist for almost 100 years and therefore 
the market is well established through well-known fast food companies. Taking 
this into account we believe that we should make a relative valuation in order to 
understand how our price-target benchmarks with the relative valuation. 
In this analysis we took into account the 6 comparable firms mentioned above 







































Fig. 59.  Sensitivity Analysis.    
Source: Analysts Estimates.  
Fig. 60.  Scenario Analysis.    
Source: Analysts Estimates 
Fig. 61.  Relative Valuation. 
Source: Bloomberg and Analysts Estimates  
226 9,89% 12,89% 15,89% 18,89% 21,89%
0,3% $187,8 $189,1 $190,0 $190,5 $191,0
0,8% $207,2 $211,4 $214,0 $215,8 $217,1
1,0% $216,8 $222,4 $225,9 $228,3 $230,0
1,2% $227,7 $235,0 $239,5 $242,6 $244,9
1,7% $263,6 $276,3 $284,1 $289,5 $293,4
Growth Rate
ROIC
226 -4,0% -2,0% 0,0% 2,0% 4,0%
-4,0% $205,9 $199,6 $193,3 $186,9 $180,6
-2,0% $222,3 $215,9 $209,6 $203,2 $196,9
0,0% $238,6 $232,3 $225,9 $219,6 $213,2
2,0% $254,9 $248,6 $242,2 $235,9 $229,5
4,0% $271,2 $264,9 $258,5 $252,2 $245,8
Change in 
Revenues
Change in Restaurant Related Costs
 
 








EV/Revenues, which are the most common in this type of analysis. Then, as we 
can observe in figure 61, we applied the multiples estimated in 2018 to the 
forecasted EPS, net income, EBITDA and Revenues in order to estimate the price 
ranges in 1,2 and 3 years. This chart is called a football field and it shows what 
are the minimum and maximum share price considering the minimum and 
maximum multiple of the comparable companies. Considering our price target of 
$225.91 per share we can conclude that it is in the high-end of the range of the 
P/E and EV/Revenues, on the low-end of the EV/EBITDA and almost in the middle 
for the EV/Net Income. We believe that overall the relative valuation strengths our 
price target and that the intrinsic value of the company is close to it. 
 
Value Creation Analysis 
A value creation analysis was made in order to analyse the economic profit 
being originated per year. The economic profit is the spread between the Return 
on Invested Capital and Weighted Average Cost of Capital times the Invested 
Capital in that period of analysis. The objective of this measure is to estimate the 
value being created to shareholders per period, which in this case is represented 
in dollars. In figure 62, we can conclude that the Economic Profit is expected to 
be between $50 and $60 billion per year, which can be interpreted as the value 






















Fig. 62.  Value Creation Analysis. 
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Consolidated Statement of Income
In millions 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
Sales by Company-operated restaurants 18 169 16 488 15 295 12 719 10 013 9 490 8 910 8 627 8 399 8 322 8 485 8 678 8 843 8 969 9 097
Revenues from franchised restaurants 9 272 8 925 9 327 10 102 11 013 11 759 12 245 12 736 13 173 13 592 13 910 14 201 14 452 14 654 14 857
Total revenues 27 441 25 413 24 622 22 820 21 025 21 249 21 156 21 364 21 572 21 914 22 395 22 879 23 295 23 623 23 953
Food & paper 6 130 5 552 4 897 4 034 3 154 3 233 3 035 2 939 2 861 2 835 2 890 2 956 3 012 3 055 3 098
Payroll & employee benefits 4 756 4 400 4 134 3 529 2 938 2 608 2 419 2 321 2 255 2 236 2 288 2 359 2 402 2 445 2 489
Occupancy & other operating expenses 4 403 4 025 3 668 2 848 2 174 1 937 1 893 1 876 1 872 1 871 1 907 1 959 1 989 2 021 2 055
Company-operated restaurant expenses 15 288 13 977 12 699 10 410 8 266 7 778 7 346 7 135 6 987 6 941 7 085 7 274 7 403 7 522 7 643
Company-Operated Gross Margin 15,9% 15,2% 17,0% 18,2% 17,4% 18,0% 17,6% 17,3% 16,8% 16,6% 16,5% 16,2% 16,3% 16,1% 16,0%
Franchised restaurants-occupancy expenses 1 697 1 647 1 719 1 790 1 974 2 147 2 222 2 303 2 384 2 469 2 560 2 599 2 637 2 678 2 720
Franchised restaurants Gross Margin 81,7% 81,5% 81,6% 82,3% 82,1% 81,7% 81,9% 81,9% 81,9% 81,8% 81,6% 81,7% 81,8% 81,7% 81,7%
Total Gross Profit 10 456 9 789 10 205 10 621 10 786 11 325 11 587 11 926 12 201 12 503 12 750 13 007 13 255 13 423 13 591
Total Gross Margin 38,1% 38,5% 41,4% 46,5% 51,3% 53,3% 54,8% 55,8% 56,6% 57,1% 56,9% 56,8% 56,9% 56,8% 56,7%
Selling, general & administrative expenses 2 488 2 434 2 385 2 231 2 200 2 233 2 381 2 452 2 538 2 652 2 758 2 863 2 936 2 990 3 032
Other operating (income) expense, net 19 209 76 -1 163 -237 -112 -147 -147 -147 -147 -147 -147 -147 -147 -147
EBIT 7 949 7 146 7 744 9 553 8 822 9 203 9 353 9 621 9 810 9 998 10 139 10 291 10 466 10 581 10 706
Operating Margin 29,0% 28,1% 31,5% 41,9% 42,0% 43,3% 44,2% 45,0% 45,5% 45,6% 45,3% 45,0% 44,9% 44,8% 44,7%
Interest expense-net of capitalized interest 576 638 885 921 981 1 032 1 162 1 180 1 214 1 240 1 266 1 291 1 312 1 334 1 350
Nonoperating (income) expense, net 1 -49 -6 58 25 -59 16 18 20 22 24 26 24 24 24
EBT 7 372 6 556 6 866 8 573 7 816 8 230 8 175 8 423 8 576 8 736 8 849 8 975 9 130 9 223 9 333
EBT Margin 27% 26% 28% 38% 37% 39% 39% 39% 40% 40% 40% 39% 39% 39% 39%
Provision for income taxes 2 614 2 026 2 180 3 381 1 892 2 576 2 604 2 669 2 715 2 761 2 795 2 833 2 578 2 606 2 637
Effective Tax Rate 36% 31% 32% 39% 24% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 24% 24% 24%
Net income 4 758 4 529 4 686,4 5 192 5 924 5 654 5 571 5 754 5 861 5 975 6 054 6 142 6 553 6 617 6 696
Profit Margin 17% 18% 19% 23% 28% 27% 26% 27% 27% 27% 27% 27% 28% 28% 28%
Consolidated Balance Sheet
In Millions of USD except Per Share 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
Current assets
Cash and equivalents 2 078 7 686 1 223 2 464 866 274 254 246 228 210 212 212 214 216 219
Accounts and notes receivable 1 214 1 299 1 474 1 976 2 442 2 232 2 223 2 244 2 266 2 302 2 353 2 404 2 447 2 482 2 516
Inventories, at cost, not in excess of market 110 100 59 59 51 48 45 44 43 43 44 45 46 47 47
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 762 559 565 828 695 604 601 607 613 623 636 650 662 671 681
Assets of businesses held for sale 0 0 1 527 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total current assets 4 164 9 643 4 849 5 327 4 053 3 159 3 123 3 142 3 151 3 178 3 245 3 310 3 369 3 415 3 463
Other assets
Investments in and advances to affiliates 1 005 793 726 1 086 1 203 1 265 1 318 1 371 1 424 1 480 1 511 1 542 1 573 1 605 1 638
Goodwill 2 988 2 274 2 062 2 312 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101 3 101
Miscellaneous 1 153 1 336 1 051 1 695 1 162 1 134 1 130 1 141 1 152 1 170 1 196 1 221 1 243 1 261 1 279
Total other assets 5 145 4 403 3 839 5 093 5 465 5 500 5 548 5 612 5 677 5 750 5 807 5 864 5 918 5 967 6 017
Property and equipment
Property and equipment, at cost 39 126 37 692 34 443 36 626 37 194 39 557 41 805 44 094 46 453 48 695 50 939 53 227 55 519 57 878 60 305
Accumulated depreciation & Amortization -14 569 -14 575 -13 186 -14 178 -14 351 -15 886 -17 470 -19 110 -20 807 -22 558 -24 397 -26 283 -28 202 -30 154 -32 143
Net property and equipment 24 558 23 118 21 258 22 448 22 843 23 671 24 335 24 984 25 646 26 137 26 543 26 943 27 318 27 724 28 162
Total assets 33 867 37 164 29 945 32 868 32 361 32 330 33 006 33 738 34 474 35 065 35 595 36 117 36 604 37 106 37 642
Current liabilities
Accounts payable 860 875 756 925 1 208 1 003 947 920 900 894 913 938 954 970 985
Income taxes 167 155 267 266 228 242 245 252 257 262 266 270 274 277 280
Other taxes 330 309 266 275 254 268 271 279 285 290 294 298 303 307 310
Accrued interest 234 233 248 278 297 234 236 237 239 240 241 243 244 245 247
Accrued payroll and other liabilities 1 157 1 379 1 159 1 146 987 902 835 800 776 762 765 781 789 797 805
Current maturities of long-term debt 0 0 77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Liabilities of businesses held for sale 0 0 880 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss carryforwards, net of taxes 1 -97 -125 92 625 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Total current liabilities 2 749 2 853 3 529 2 983 3 599 2 748 2 634 2 588 2 556 2 548 2 579 2 628 2 664 2 695 2 727
Long-term debt 14 936 24 122 25 879 29 536 31 075 34 983 35 512 36 548 37 340 38 117 38 849 39 491 40 154 40 633 41 155
Long-term income taxes 0 0 0 2 371 2 081 1 784 1 487 1 189 892 595 297 0 0 0 0
Deferred revenues - initial franchise fees 0 0 0 0 628 644 654 663 671 680 687 694 701 709 716
Other long-term liabilities 2 066 2 074 2 064 1 154 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096 1 096
Net Deferred Income Tax Liabilities 1 263 1 027 678 92 140 104 106 109 111 113 114 116 118 119 121
Shareholders' equity (Deficit)
Common stock 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Additional paid-in capital 6 239 6 533 6 758 7 072 7 376 7 660 7 944 8 229 8 513 8 797 9 081 9 366 9 650 9 934 10 218
Retained earnings 43 295 44 595 46 223 48 326 50 487 53 342 56 448 59 958 63 532 67 177 70 870 74 616 78 613 82 649 86 733
Accumulated other comprehensive income -1 520 -2 880 -3 093 -2 178 -2 610 -2 766 -2 903 -3 007 -3 079 -3 117 -3 123 -3 129 -3 135 -3 140 -3 146
Common stock in treasury, at cost -35 177 -41 177 -52 109 -56 504 -61 529 -67 282 -69 987 -73 650 -77 175 -80 957 -84 872 -88 778 -93 274 -97 606 -101 995
Total shareholders' equity (deficit) 12 853 7 088 -2 204 -3 268 -6 258 -9 029 -8 481 -8 455 -8 192 -8 084 -8 028 -7 909 -8 130 -8 147 -8 173
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity (deficit) 33 867 37 164 29 945 32 868 32 361 32 330 33 006 33 738 34 474 35 065 35 595 36 117 36 604 37 106 37 642
 
 













































Disclosures and Disclaimers 
 
Report Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) of more than 10% 
over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) between 0% and 
10% over a 12-month period. 




Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows
In millions            2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E
NOPLAT 5207 5061 5452 6074 6714 7231 7284 7488 7634 7779 7888 8005 8139 8228 8325
Depreciation 1645 1556 1517 1363 1482 1535 1584 1640 1697 1751 1839 1887 1918 1952 1989
Operational Cash-Flow 6851 6617 6969 7437 8196 8767 8868 9127 9331 9530 9727 9892 10057 10181 10314
Change in Operational Cash 0 20 8 18 18 -64 20 8 18 18 -2 1 -2 -2 -3
Change in Accounts and notes receivable 0 -84 -175 -502 -465 209 10 -22 -22 -36 -51 -51 -44 -34 -35
Change in Inventories, at cost, not in excess of market 0 10 41 0 8 3 3 1 1 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Change in Accrued payroll and other liabilities 0 222 -220 -13 -160 -85 -67 -35 -24 -13 3 16 8 8 8
Change in Accounts Payable 0 15 -119 169 283 -205 -56 -27 -19 -6 19 24 17 15 16
Change in Deferred revenues - initial franchise fees 0 0 0 0 628 16 10 9 9 8 8 7 7 7 7
Change in Income taxes 0 -12 112 -1 -38 14 3 7 5 5 4 4 5 3 3
Change in Other taxes 0 -21 -43 9 -22 14 3 8 5 5 4 4 5 3 4
Investment in NWC and Others 0 149 -395 -321 252 -98 -74 -51 -28 -18 -17 5 -5 0 -1
Capital expenditures, net of disposals 0 -116 344 -2554 -1876 -2364 -2248 -2289 -2359 -2242 -2245 -2287 -2293 -2359 -2427
Change in Investments in capitalized operating leases 0 261 2364 1896 -299 -245 -184 -170 -163 -95 -122 -120 -121 -122 -123
Change in Investments in and advances to affiliates 0 212 67 -360 -117 -62 -53 -53 -54 -55 -31 -31 -31 -32 -32
Net Investment 0 357 2775 -1018 -2292 -2671 -2484 -2512 -2575 -2392 -2398 -2439 -2445 -2512 -2582
Investment Cash-Flow 0 506 2380 -1339 -2040 -2769 -2558 -2563 -2603 -2411 -2415 -2434 -2450 -2513 -2583
Core Free Cash Flow 6851 7123 9349 6098 6156 5998 6310 6565 6728 7120 7311 7457 7607 7668 7731
Nonoperating income after taxes -1963 -1527 -249 1996 -197 40 11 42 73 104 135 133 135 135 134
Nonoperating taxes 604 956 948 -102 314 -294 -293 -293 -293 -293 -293 -293 4 4 4
Operational Cash-Flow -1358 -571 699 1893 117 -254 -282 -251 -220 -189 -159 -161 139 139 139
Change in Prepaid expenses and other current assets 0 201 -6 -264 134 92 3 -6 -6 -10 -14 -14 -12 -9 -9
Change in Assets of businesses held for sale 0 0 -1527 1527 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Miscellaneous 0 -184 281 -645 533 30 5 -11 -11 -18 -26 -26 -22 -17 -18
Change in Goodwill 0 713 212 -250 -788 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Loss carryforwards, net of taxes 0 -99 -27 217 533 -526 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Liabilities of businesses held for sale 0 0 880 -880 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Other long-term liabilities 0 8 -10 -910 -58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Long-term income taxes 0 0 0 2371 -290 -297 -297 -297 -297 -297 -297 -297 0 0 0
Investment Cash-Flow 0 640 -195 1165 64 -702 -290 -314 -314 -325 -337 -337 -34 -27 -27
Nonoperating Cash flow -1358 69 503 3058 181 -956 -572 -566 -534 -515 -495 -497 105 112 112
Cash Flow available to investors 5493 7192 9852 9156 6338 5042 5738 5999 6194 6605 6816 6960 7712 7780 7843
Financial Income -1038 -1085 -1329 -1274 -1386 -1444 -1569 -1590 -1627 -1655 -1683 -1710 -1733 -1757 -1775
Increase in operating tax liabilities 0 -236 -349 -586 48 -36 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Change in Cash and equivalents 0 -5628 6454 -1258 1580 656 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Prepaid expenses and other current assets 0 3 -1 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Miscellaneous 0 1 4 2 0 -3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Accrued interest 0 -1 14 31 19 -63 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Change in Current maturities of long-term debt 0 0 77 -77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Change in Capitalized Operating Leases 0 -261 -2364 -1896 299 245 184 170 163 95 122 120 121 122 123
Change in Long-term debt 0 9186 1756 3658 1539 3908 529 1037 791 777 732 642 663 480 522
Flow to Debt Holders -1038 1979 4263 -1400 2098 3262 -853 -379 -669 -779 -826 -944 -946 -1153 -1128
Change in Operating deferred-tax liabilities (assets) 0 -236 -349 -586 48 -36 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Cash Dividends -3216 -3230 -3058 -3089 -3256 -2799 -2466 -2244 -2286 -2331 -2361 -2396 -2556 -2581 -2612
Repurchased (issued) shares -3175 -6182 -11142 -4651 -5248 -5956 -2907 -3866 -3727 -3984 -4117 -4108 -4699 -4534 -4591
Share-based compensation 113 110 131 118 125 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119
Stock option exercises and other 312 368 303 452 402 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367 367
Adoption of ASC 606 0 0 0 0 -450 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Adoption of ASU 2016-16 0 0 0 0 -57 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Flow to Equity Holders -5967 -9171 -14115 -7756 -8436 -8304 -4885 -5620 -5525 -5826 -5990 -6016 -6766 -6627 -6715
Cash Flow available to investors -7005 -7192 -9852 -9156 -6338 -5042 -5738 -5999 -6194 -6605 -6816 -6960 -7712 -7780 -7843
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Online Food Delivery was worth $83 billion in 2018 and is expected to grow to $200 
billion by 2025. McDonald’s partnered with Uber Eats and others to create the McDelivery, 
service that is expected to represent $4 billion in sales at year-end 2019. In this report there is 
an in-depth analysis to the advantages and disadvantages of providing this new service that has 
proven to be a rewarding challenge for McDonald’s. The geographic growth opportunities in 
delivery are also analyzed and compared with McDonald’s restaurant coverage of those areas, 
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McDelivery in the Online Food Delivery Industry 
Nowadays we live in the era of the digital, where everything we seem to know and 
take for granted is constantly changing and there are new services, new technologies and new 
consumer preferences. Delivery appeared as consumers sought convenience and platforms 
like Uber Eats created a response for those needs. According to an article published by 
Sarwant Singh (from Frost & Sullivan) in the Financial Times, the Online Food Delivery 
(OFD) industry was estimated to be around $83 billions in 2018 worldwide, and set to more 
than double by 2025, backed by a cumulative annual growth rate of 14%. These numbers can 
be double-checked with Appendix 1, where we observe that OFD revenues are in an upward 
trend. According to Statista, users for this service are also on the rise, being 1 billion 
worldwide in 2018 and expected to be around 1.6 billion in 2023. 
 McDelivery  
According to CNBC, McDonald’s filled for the trademark “McDelivery” 
(McDonald’s delivery system) in 1993. The company has tried to create its own Restaurant-
to-Consumer delivery system to complement its offerings, but never quite made it. Instead, 
the company decided to make partnerships with the main platforms of each region in order to 
provide this new service to their customers. Kevin Ozan, Executive Vice President and CFO 
of McDonald’s announced, on the third quarter earnings call of 2019, that McDelivery was 
already present in over 23,000 restaurants worldwide in over 80 countries, having been 
registered 10 delivery calls per second, on average, worldwide, which represents close to 26 
million orders a month. Moreover, these orders amount to two times the average check in 
restaurants, on average, globally.  As it is observable in Appendix 2, the price/mix, which 
represents the percentage change in the average check per order, has been incredibly high, 
driven by menu price increases but mainly due to the double average checks seen in the 
McDelivery. In terms of size, the McDelivery is expected to represent 4% of global 
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systemwide sales in 2019, which is equivalent to $4 billions. If we compare this number with 
the forecasted $108 billions of market size for the online food delivery industry in 2019, it 
represents a market-share of 3.7% (globally). 
I. Advantages 
The main advantage for McDonald’s is enhanced revenues through (i) Higher average check; 
(ii) New customers: Steve Easterbrook commented on the fourth quarter earnings call of 2018 
that delivery showed an incrementality around 70%, meaning that 70% of delivery sales 
wouldn’t happen if the service didn’t exist. Also, 60% of the online delivery orders are made 
off-peak hours, which reinforces the idea that it is bringing new customers. (ii) Increased 
order frequency: the company also states in the annual report of 2018 that satisfaction and re-
ordering ratio are high and that the likeliness of re-ordering for these customers is also high. 
Apart from the revenues increase, the company also benefits from more customer 
interaction with the brand through the delivery platform, raises fidelity for customers that 
truly appreciate McDonald’s and also raises an opportunity for McDonald’s to do targeted 
discounts through delivery platforms. 
II. Disadvantages 
Although believing that McDelivery was a good decision for McDonald’s and that it 
raised its intrinsic value, it also brings some disadvantages that are important to point out. 
According to an article written by Nathaniel Meyersohn in the CNN Business, Uber Eats 
partnerships can be dangerous for the restaurants: (i) Profitability: with so much competition 
in the food industry, especially on the quick-service restaurants, having to pay service fees of 
15% to 30% to platforms can be unbearable, even more taking into account that when 
ordering, customers are less likely to ask for core menu items; (ii) Cannibalization: although 
McDonald’s says that 70% of the orders are incremental, there is always a share that is 
cannibalization from restaurant revenues; (iii) Poor food quality: food in a package for too 
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much time might result in cold and lower quality food, damaging the McDonald’s brand; (4) 
Changing loyalties: when using a platform, the customer is interacting with the delivery 
service and not with McDonald’s, meaning that it gives an incentive for the customer to 
change their loyalty from the brand itself to the courier’s brand.  
 Geographic Opportunities  
Considering the growth opportunities in the OFD market, it is important to analyse if 
McDonald’s can take an advantage. Taking into account that around 70% of the McDelivery 
sales are incremental, as the OFD market grows, McDonald’s sales will grow too. 
At the end of 2018, McDonald’s had 8,514 stores located in Europe, its second largest 
market by geography. This are good news as Europe is also one of the geographies where the 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) is higher: 11.9% (Appendix 3). According to Statista, 
the UK is expected to have a CAGR equal to 9.3%, Germany equal to 9.6%, France equal to 
13.7%, Spain equal to 14.1% and Italy equal to 11.7%. These 5 countries count to a total of 
5,337 stores, meaning that McDonald’s is well positioned to have sale increases there. 
However, this market is also very small compared with the others, amounting only $14 
billions in delivery sales for the year of 2018. This means that although there is growth, the 
size of the market isn’t big enough to have a huge impact on the McDonald’s overall sales.  
United States is the biggest country for McDonald’s and the one that generates more 
revenues, representing 13,914 of the total McDonald’s restaurants. In Appendix 4 we can 
observe that the US had a market size of around $20 billions in 2018 and is expected to grow 
at a CAGR of 7.1% until 2023. This might be the segment where incremental sales will 
increase more if McDonald’s holds its market share in the Online Food Delivery industry 
because it has a decent volume and decent growth rate. 
From the geographies analysed, China is the one that has less representation with only 
3,002 stores. However, it is the market where Online Food Delivery shines, with a size of 
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around $34 billions in 2018 and compound annual growth rate of 11.2% until 2023. 
(Appendix 5) McDonald’s revealed that it expects to open around 600 stores in China in the 
year of 2019 (and a total of 1200 worldwide). Taking this into account, there is reason to 
believe that China sales will increase both because there are more stores and because there are 
more incremental sales, namely through delivery and its growth. 
 Conclusion 
Taking into account the estimated market share of McDonald’s in the OFD industry, 
which is equal to 3.7%, and the revealed incremental sales of 70% on delivery, we can 
estimate what are the incremental sales increase worldwide from 2019 until 2023 through 
delivery (Appendix 6). Assuming that McDonald’s will keep its market-share over time in the 
Online Food Delivery industry in sales, McDelivery is expected to increase from $4 billions 
in 2019 to around $5.8 billions in 2023 (of which 70%, equivalent to $4 billion, represent 
incremental sales). It might not seem a lot taking into account that we are talking of a 
company with around $90-$100 billions in sales per year, but the magic word is 
“incremental”. McDonald’s doesn’t want to grow their sales only with store counts. The 
breakfast items, McCafé, plant based Beyond Meat burgers and much more is proof that they 
want to attract new clients and make them stick around. Furthermore, delivery is one more 
step to grow the business and it is one of the main drivers of same-store sales nowadays. 
Finally, it is important to point out that awareness of McDelivery existence is still low and as 
the company invests more on customer awareness, it is likely that its share on the worldwide 
Online Food Delivery market grows as well. On the other side, McDelivery might also cause 
harm on the long-term perspective because it might deteriorate customers perspective on food 
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Appendix 1. Revenues and Forecasts for the OFD 
market. 
Source: Statista  
 
Appendix 3. Europe Online Food Delivery Revenue 
Forecast. 
Source: Statista  
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Appendix 4. US Online Food Delivery Revenue 
Forecast. 
Source: Statista  
 
Appendix 6. Estimated McDonald’s Delivery Sales 
Worldwide. 
Source: Statista and Analyst Estimate.  
 
Appendix 5. China Online Food Delivery Revenue 
Forecast. 
Source: Statista  
 
